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Religious Tribunals and Secular Courts: 
Navigating Power and Powerlessness 
Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin 
A.  The Challenge of Integrating Multiple Systems of Law 
The growth and increased visibility of religious communities that seek 
to preserve their religious legal systems, a growing backlash against the use 
of these religious systems, and the inevitability that some aspects of the 
religious legal system will present themselves within the secular legal 
system all create opportunities to explore how religious communities attempt 
to navigate multiple legal norms, as well as multiple value systems that 
come into conflict with each other.  The story of the modern day victim of 
get refusal, known as an agunah, allows for an exploration of how a 
religious community experiences power and powerlessness as its own 
religious laws intersect with the secular legal system, through which the 
religious community’s goals are both advanced and hindered.  The agunah’s 
story also allows for thinking about how to preserve one’s interest in having 
personal status issues adjudicated in concert with one’s religious-based legal 
systems.  
In this Article, I will focus on the various ways that religious systems 
have attempted to navigate their relationship with the secular legal system 
and the secular system of values by looking at common law, legislation, and 
contract.  I will think about the conceptualization of how contract can be 
used both to avoid interference of the secular legal system, as well as to 
provide the religious legal system with some enforceability.  As the use of 
religious contracts to negotiate the intersection with secular law becomes 
more popular, contracts could be used to further the aims of those interested 
in protecting the autonomy of religious legal systems, while still thinking 
through how notions of basic protection available to both genders in secular 
law may be available to those interested in religious legal systems, and still 
balancing interests in equality and contemporary notions of basic rights with 
the religious legal system. 
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B.  A Case Study: The Agunah 
The case of agunah in halakhic literature typically involves a husband 
who was missing without proof of death, which was not uncommon before 
modern communication and travel.1  A paradigmatic case involved a 
husband whose ship sunk in a large body of water out of sight of shore.2  
Without proof of death, the woman cannot remarry and must remain in a 
state of limbo, “chained” to a man whose whereabouts are unknown—she 
remains neither a widow nor a divorcee, unable to remarry for fear that her 
husband is still alive and may return some day.3  A twentieth-century 
example involved women whose husbands were sent to death camps in Nazi 
Germany,4 and a more recent example involved women whose husbands 
worked in the areas of the 9/11 attacks.5  Without proof of death, they were 
agunot, married women neither widowed nor divorced.  It was only after a 
lengthy period of time—during which the beit din (court of Jewish law) 
worked to adjudicate the missing husbands as dead under Jewish law—that 
they were free to remarry.6 
The agunah, with whom modern contract law is concerned, is a very 
different creature than her historic counterpart and more accurately known 
as a mesurevet get, or one who is a victim of get refusal.7  Although, the 
agnuah’s husband is alive, and his whereabouts are well known, he 
nonetheless refuses to participate in the get process either out of spite or in 
order to obtain concessions on financial or custody matters that he would 
otherwise not be granted by a court.8  Interestingly, even though the woman 
 
 1.  See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: YEBAMOT 12a. 
 2.  See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: YEBAMOT 121a-121b.  The Rabbinic rules addressing the 
presumptions of death are intensely fact specific and vary depending on the nature of the water body 
wherein the tragedy occurred, the specific legal question for which the presumption is sought, and 
the precise language of the testimony given.  See EVEN HA’EZER 17:32, 34–35; BEIT 
SHMUEL 17:105; ARUCH HASHULCHAN E.H. 17:212−27. 
 3.  See Encyclopedia Judaica, supra note 2.  
 4.  See, e.g., TESHUVOT IGROT MOSHE E.H. 1:43 (discussing how the classic case of “water 
without end” applies to husbands who were not found following the Holocaust). 
 5.  See generally MICHAEL J. BROYDE, CONTENDING WITH CATASTROPHE: JEWISH 
PERSPECTIVES ON SEPTEMBER 11TH (2011) (reflecting on the response of Jewish law to the tragedy 
of 9/11). 
 6.  See id. 
 7.  See IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE 
AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY xi (1993). 
 8.  See Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 
32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 363 (1999).  See also Shlomo Weissmann, Ending the Agunah 
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can technically also refuse to accept a get, and thereby trap her husband in 
the marriage, statistically the husband is almost always the perpetrator.9  
Withholding the get is an abusive act.10  Often the latest in a series of 
abusive acts that brought the marriage to an end, this abusive act parallels 
other abuse statistics in the gender breakdown of perpetrators as opposed to 
victims.11  The rise of the divorce rate in the observant Jewish community 
over the last sixty years, coupled with the courts’ growing sophistication 
about gender inequalities in distribution of wealth and custody 
responsibilities and concomitant expenses, have created increased incentives 
for men to withhold the get, thus increasing the number of agunot.12  
The seeming intractability of the agunot cases, the increase of the 
number of women in this position, the seeming inability of the current 
Jewish legal system to arrive at a solution, and the growth of an observant 
feminism that has identified this problem—the “agunah crisis”—as 
emblematic of the clash between a deeply held belief in the value of the 
Jewish system of halakha and the equality of men and women as 
fundamental to a just society.13  This has all led to an intense public focus on 
the agunah crisis.14  It is both the broader public policy questions of a 
resolution of the tensions within a halakhic system, which seems unable to 
cope with this aspect of modern reality, as well as the very real and scary 
possibility of one becoming a mesurevet get, that have led to the attempts by 
lawyers, judges, Jewish legal scholars, and activists to arrive at workable 
solutions to the agunah crisis 
 
Problem as We Know It, ORTHODOX UNION (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.ou.org/life/relationships/ending-agunah-problem-as-we-know-it-shlomo-wiessmann/.  
The discussion of the get often becomes an important factor in negotiations over a divorce 
settlement.  Id.  Even when not used explicitly as blackmail, the insistence that the get will only be 
used upon the conclusion of all negotiations, or at the time of the civil divorce, means that it looms 
large in the power dynamic of the negotiations.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See Why is get-refusal considered a form of domestic abuse?, ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
RESOLUTION OF AGUNOT, http://www.getora.org/#!faq/c10kz. 
 11.  See id.  
 12.  See Abigail Jones, Divorce in the Orthodox Jewish Community Can Be Brutal, Degrading 
and Endless, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/divorce-orthodox-jewish-
community-can-be-brutal-degrading-and-endless-3082. 
 13.  See Weissmann, supra note 8.  
 14.  See, e.g., Beloff, supra note 7.  
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C.  The Problem of Multiple Systems 
The issue derives, of course, from the essential structure of marriage and 
divorce in Jewish law, which is in opposition to that of the secular legal 
system.  In the secular legal system, as in both the Catholic and Protestant 
legal systems, marriage is a status conferred on the couple by a third party, 
whether it be the state or the church.15  Because the status is conferred by a 
third party, it can be removed by that third party in the case of divorce or 
annulment.16 
In contrast, both the Jewish and the Islamic legal systems recognize 
marriage as a matter of contract between parties.17  While religious officiants 
are present in Jewish marriage ceremonies, they merely serve to confirm that 
all is done in accordance with the law, not to confer a status upon the 
couple.18  The ketubah, the Jewish marriage contract, imposes upon the 
husband a financial lien that must be paid upon divorce or his death and 
memorializes the husband’s biblical duty to provide for his wife financially 
and sexually.19  She, in turn, agrees to be bound by those obligations, and the 
ketubah then serves as the contract that sets forth some of those 
obligations.20  It also sets forth the husband’s obligations to the wife in the 
case of divorce or death.21  Therefore, as marriage begins as a contractual 
relationship, it can only be terminated by a contract-termination agreement: 
the get.22 
As with all contracts, both the marriage and the divorce agreements 
must be entered into freely.23  Unsurprisingly, a meeting of the minds and 
mutual consent are much easier to achieve when entering into a marriage 
than when ending one.  The get must be freely given, without duress, by the 
husband to the wife, who must in turn accept it freely.24  The structural issue 
 
 15.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300−310 (Deering 2014).  
 16.  See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 110 
(2d ed. 1988) (“The final [divorce] decree . . . grant(s) the dissolution of the marriage to one spouse 
or another, or in states permitting such a decree, to both spouses.”). 
 17.  BABYLONIAN TALMUD: KIDDUSHIN 2a. 
 18.  See “Ketubah” in Adin Steinzaltz Madrich LaTalmud; 1984 Keter Publishing House, 
Jerusalem. P. 172. 
 19.  MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH: HILCHOT ISHUT 12:6,8; EVEN HA’EZER 66:9.  
 20.  See Steinzaltz, supra note 18, p.172 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  See BREITOWITZ, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 23.  See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT 568 (1973) (defining “get”). 
 24.  See “Get” in Steinzaltz, supra note 18, p. 150.  
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that plagues the agunah crisis is how much pressure can be placed on the 
parties to participate in the get process without invalidating the resulting get 
as one issued under duress.25   
Of course, a secondary question is how to place any pressure at all on 
the parties in the absence of any enforcement authority of the halakhic legal 
system.  An unfortunate development, which has contributed to this 
question, is the development in the matrimonial bar where some lawyers 
refuse to allow the get to be given until all other issues, including financial, 
custody, and visitation issues, are resolved.26  This essentially allows the 
withholding of a get to remain a serious threat, whether silent or overt.27 
D.  Experiencing Power 
Traditionally, the most intractable case arose where the husband had 
disappeared.28  Without any proof of death, both the question of how to 
determine if someone died, as well as the need to balance the conflicting 
value of preventing a married woman from having children with another—
and thus creating a child within the category of mamzer29—exist in 
opposition to the strong rabbinic precedent of finding all possibilities to free 
a woman from the status of agunah and allow her to remarry.30  However, in 
a certain way, when confronted with such a question, the beit din retains all 
 
 25.  See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 812 (1998).  While 
situations do exist where a doctrine of constructive consent would be applied even in the absence of 
apparent consent, these are rare and often not of practical use.  In theory, the beit din could reach one 
of two findings while inquiring into the reasons for divorce: (1) a kofin finding, which gives the wife 
an absolute right to divorce; or (2) a yotze finding, which permits the divorce.  Under the kofin 
finding, duress—including corporal punishment, monetary fines, or lashes—would not invalidate the 
resulting get as a document executed under duress.  See EVEN HA’EZER 154:21; J. David Bleich, 
Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. 
REV. 201 (1984); MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH: HILCHOT GERUSHIN 2:20 (discussing the 
doctrine of constructive consent). 
 26.  See, e.g., Elli Fischer, Withholding a Get: Between Leverage and Extortion, JEWISH WEEK 
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.thejewishweek.com/editorial-opinion/opinion/withholding-get-between-
leverage-and-extortion. 
 27.  See, e.g., id. 
 28.  See Encyclopedia Judaica, supra note 2. 
 29.  See Gitit Paz, The Fate of a Mamzer: The Religious/Human Rights Tug of War Over How to 
Treat Illegitimate Children, JEWISH WEEK (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/israel-news/fate-mamzer (discussing the plight of the modern-
day mamzer). 
 30.  See, e.g., Maimondies Hilchot Ishut 15:31 
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power to resolve the issue because the questions are halachic entirely and 
require creative thinking about Jewish legal evidentiary standards.31  Power 
rests solely within the beit din, which can do its work under its own 
procedures and timetable, and on its own terms.32 
For example, the 9/11 cases demonstrate this principle in action.33  The 
American beit din that adjudicated these cases, the Beth Din of America, 
was able to work methodically and on its own terms, and paid little attention 
to the secular legal system, which was struggling itself with the issuance of 
death certificates.34  The beit din’s independence can occur when the matter 
is entirely one of religious concern and does not involve either the 
intersection with other legal systems or the encroachment on its power.35   
The modern day agunah, the mesurevet get, is a more perplexing 
problem, as the get refuser essentially exists both within and outside of the 
community’s power.36  The get refuser, writ large, essentially sticks his hand 
on his nose and wiggles his fingers, leaving the rabbinic tribunals 
disempowered and small.  From this perspective, he poses a challenge to the 
religious tribunal, which, perhaps out of fear of being ignored, is reluctant to 
issue a definitive statement.37  Instead, the religious tribunal often chooses to 
pursue a path that involves negotiation in hopes of convincing the spouse to 
abide by its words without resort to secular courts, other religious tribunals, 
or communal pressure, all of which can be difficult to organize and are not 
always effective.38 
E.  Proposed Jewish Legal Solutions 
With that, there have been ongoing attempts to mine Jewish legal 
tradition for innovative halakhic solutions to the agunah crisis.39  While 
 
 31.  Maimonideis Hilchot Gerushin 13:6. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  See BROYDE, supra note 5 (discussing the adjudication of the 9/11 widows who required a 
Jewish court to declare them free to remarry). 
 34.  See id.  
 35.  See, e.g., Ginnine Fried, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din 
Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (2004) (discussing the 
relationship between the beit din and secular courts).  
 36.  See Beloff, supra note 7.  
 37.  See, e.g., Shanah D. Glick, The Agunah in the American Legal System: Problems and 
Solutions, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 885 (1992).  
 38.  See, e.g., id. 
 39.  Id. 
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these attempts obviously are driven primarily by the desire to preserve the 
ethical integrity of the halakhic legal system and help individuals in pain, 
they are also driven, in part, by a desire to entirely separate matters of 
Jewish law from the secular legal system, and thus arrive at solutions that do 
not implicate the secular legal system at all.40 
Some proposed solutions seek to change the status quo of marriage 
formation itself.  For example, if there is no contractual marriage, then there 
is no need for a get to dissolve a marriage.41  There are solutions that seek to 
re-envision and empower the beit din as a third party to the marriage, thus 
empowering the beit din to dissolve the marriage without the mutual consent 
requirement of the get process.42  This would aim to structure marriage more 
in line with Christian marriage or state marriage in the United States, where 
a third party confers the status of marriage on the couple rather than having 
the marriage exist entirely as a matter of contract.43  
There are other solutions that look into the act of contract formation at 
the time of marriage and identify potential flaws in the marriage formation 
itself.44  For example, kiddushei ta’ut, a salient defect in the contract 
formation, precludes a meeting of the minds in the formation of the 
marriage.45 
Another proposal is conditional marriage, wherein the breaking of some 
condition would render the marriage void.46  Thus, without any other action 
by other parties, any intervention by the beit din, and any need for the giving 
of a get, the marriage ends.47  Yet another proposal is conditional divorce, 
 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Proposed solutions have included instituting “concubinage” as a sort of common law 
marriage rather than the current marriage system known as kiddushin.  BREITOWITZ, supra note 7, at 
68–70.  Others suggest preemptively including a defective witness as part of the marriage ceremony 
in order to be able to annul the marriage in the future if necessary.  Id. 
 42.  See, e.g., Alexandra Leichter, The Impact of Jewish Divorce Law on Family Law Litigation, 
14 OHIO DOM. REL. J. 41, 41 n.1 (2002).  
 43.  One option that has been explored is hafka’at kidushin, or the voiding or annulment of 
marriage for technical reasons, which assumes that the authorities are part of the marriage in a 
technical way.  See SHLOMO RISKIN, WOMEN AND JEWISH DIVORCE (1989).  
 44.  This method was advocated by the so-called “Rackman Beit Din,” which was established to 
free agunot.  See Michael I. Rackman, Kiddushei Ta’ut: Annulment as a Solution to the Agunah 
Problem, in 33:3 TRADITION, 102 (1999), available at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/ 
23262207?uid=3739256&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103547758297. 
 45.  See id. at 103. 
 46.  See  ELIEZER BERKOVITS, TNAI B’NISUIN UB’GET (1967). 
 47.  See id. 
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which states that divorce is automatic when present conditions are met.48  In 
this case, the beit din serves a procedural function to ratify that the 
conditions have in fact taken place.49 
The various proposed Jewish legal solutions have not yet been broadly 
adopted, although some are used in individual cases from time to time.50  
The lack of a broad acceptance of a particular halakhic solution is both 
symptomatic of a system that lacks a single supreme Jewish legal authority 
(unlike in Catholicism, for example) and descriptive of the complicated 
consequences of freeing a woman from marriage without a divorce 
document.51  One such consequence includes the fear that the end of the 
marriage was improper, and as such, any children from a future relationship 
will be treated as mamzerim—children of an adulterous relationship.52  The 
preponderance of legal authorities explain that the specter of the status of a 
woman being deemed by some authorities to still be married limits the 
possibility of future marriage.53  Individual religious courts are thus reluctant 
to use the full power of their authority, for fear of creating a situation where 
a woman viewed by some as free is viewed by others as married.54 
F.  The Agunah in Common Law 
There have been a number of attempts to utilize the courts to arrive at a 
solution to the problem of the recalcitrant spouse.55  A review of the different 
approaches that state courts have attempted to level at this issue serves as a 
reminder of the difficulties of relying on the civil court system to adjudicate 
disputes that touch on matters of religious personal status. 
One line of cases deals with an explicit agreement, usually in the civil 
divorce degree, whereby the parties agree to give a get at a specified time.56  
 
 48.  See ELIYAHU HENKIN, PERUSHEI IBRA  87−117 (1943). 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See generally Glick, supra note 37 (discussing the proposed solutions to the agunah crisis in 
the American legal system).  
 51.  See id.  
 52.  The children of a female, but not male, adulterer are considered mamzerim─a status that 
attaches to them going forward and limits their ability to marry others in the Jewish community.  See 
Leichter, supra note 42, at 41.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See, e.g., Glick, supra note 37. 
 56.  See, e.g.,  Waxstein v. Waxstein  395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 
(App. Div. 1977); Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Rubin v. Rubin 348 
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When one of the parties fails to fulfill their obligation regarding the get, the 
other party brings an action for specific performance.57  While some 
jurisdictions refuse to enforce actions for specific performance, others have 
stated that, as the giving of the get does not require the profession of faith, 
the get can indeed be enforced through a specific performance action.58  A 
second line of cases has gone further and inferred an agreement to give a get 
by virtue of the initial participation in a religious ceremony.59  The remedy 
has been either enforcing a requirement that the parties appear before a 
religious tribunal to resolve these issues60 or enforcing a specific requirement 
that the get be given.61  Such a remedy implicates questions of duress under 
Jewish law, potentially hoisting any resultant get on the petard of a coerced 
get, and thereby invaliding it.62  
There appears to be little rhyme or reason as to what drives state court 
decisions in this area.  The complicated issues of the constitutional questions 
raised by the courts’ involvement in these issues and the various remedies 
and dictates as to whether giving the get is a religious act seem to indicate, 
in part, what drives some of the decisions: a sense by judges that their 
courtrooms are being used to perpetuate an injustice and an attempt by 
judges to rectify that injustice as much as they believe possible under the 
law.63  
In interesting ways, the secular courts are attempting to navigate their 
intersection with religious tribunals.  It is important, however, to note that 
the judges involved in these cases are often well aware of an injustice being 
perpetrated outside of their courtrooms, which at times will undermine their 
resolutions in the courtroom, such as those on custody or financial matters.64 
 
N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fam. Ct. 1973). 
 57.  See Leichter, supra note 42, at 41. 
 58.  See, e.g., Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 68.  
 59.  See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that because 
the couple used an Orthodox ketubah, even though they were married in a Reconstructionist Jewish 
ceremony, the ketubah required the husband to give a get); see also Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).  
 60.  See, e.g., Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1021 (giving the husband a choice between freely giving 
a get or appearing before a beit din); Burns, 538 A.2d. at 441; Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 
139 (N.Y. 1983); Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 373. 
 61.  See, e.g., Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808, 812–13 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992); Minkin, 434 A.2d at 
668. 
 62.  See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT, supra note 23, at 568.  
 63.  See, e.g., Scholl, 621 A.2d at 812 (requiring the issuance of a get).  
 64.  See, e.g., id. at 813 (finding for the wife when the husband withheld the get to “make her 
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It is also interesting to think about the role of the religious tribunals in 
the background.  They too are aware of the limitations of their power to 
resolve the case at hand and well understand that the secular courts may hold 
the key to resolving the issue on their behalf.  Yet, in addition to the specific 
halakhic concerns about duress, there is the larger concern about the lack of 
power and agency in addressing a question that is halakhic in nature, as well 
as the meta-halakhic concern about utilizing secular courts at all as a path to 
resolve disputes among faith members.65 
G.  Legislative Attempts to Address the Agunah Issue  
There have also been attempts at legislative solutions, most notably the 
two New York get laws.66  The history of the get laws speaks to this as yet 
another attempt to harness the power of the secular law to resolve a religious 
dispute.67  The thinking is that the courts themselves are an inadvertent party 
to the injustice; as such, this empowers them to right the wrong.68  Although 
there have been attempts to pass other get laws in states with large Jewish 
communities, they have been mostly unsuccessful.  However, both Canada69 
and England70 have get laws. 
The first New York get law,71  passed in 1983, allowed the plaintiff in a 
civil divorce case to ask the judge to require that both parties submit an 
affidavit indicating that the party has removed all barriers to religious 
remarriage.72  The second New York get law,73 passed in 1992, permits the 
 
suffer”).  
 65.  See, e.g., Michael Broyde, Marriage, Divorce and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law, Ktav, 
NJ, 2001, p.104, and p. 110 (see footnote 25). 
 66.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 253, 236B(5)(h), 236B(6)(d) (McKinney 2010).  
 67.  See Malinowitz, supra note 65 (“The halachic process, which, under most circumstances 
solves [agunah] problems when followed through, is undercut by ‘solutions’ such as [the get 
laws].”).  
 68.  See id.  
 69.  See Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. 21.1 (2nd Supp.) (Can.) (refusing the recalcitrant 
spouse certain rights in court, such as the right to bring or defend a motion); Family Law Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. F.3, s. 2(4)–(7) (allowing similar relief, permitting parties to request of the other party to 
notify the court that barriers to remarriage have been removed, as well as permitting the voiding of 
separation or settlement agreements if the giving of the get was taken into account). 
 70.  Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27, (Eng,).  
 71.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 2010). 
 72.  Id.  Interestingly, Governor Mario Cuomo, when asked about the constitutionality of the get 
law he signed, noted that New York’s “excellent courts will make that clear in due time,” and he was 
read by the press as perseverating about the constitutionality of the law.  Cuomo Signs Law to Block 
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judge to take into account whether “barriers to remarriage” have been 
removed when distributing property, essentially “allowing judges to set a 
higher level of alimony until a get is executed, subject to reduction 
afterwards.”74   
However, there is little to suggest that the get laws in New York have 
assisted in resolving a large number of agunah cases.75  As such, the tactic of 
pursuing legislative solutions has mostly been abandoned.76  Indeed, 
although the New York get laws are neutrally worded and hold the potential 
to assist women in the Muslim community as well, they appear not to have 
helped Muslim or Jewish women on that front.77  It is interesting that while 
the second New York get law was originally backed by a large number of 
Jewish groups, at least one prominent group later declared that the structure 
of this law essentially meant that men divorcing in New York were under the 
specter of financial pressure to give a get; as such, every get given in New 
York was under the cloud of duress.78  This complicated relationship with 
secular legal solutions is reflective of the ambivalent relationship between 
the secular courts and the beit din—which seeks to have its word enforced—
regarding questions of the allocation of power to resolve these issues.79 
 
Misuse of Jewish Divorce, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 1983, at 1. 
 73.   N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(h), (6)(d)  (McKinney 2010). 
 74.  Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 374 (1999); see also BREITOWITZ, supra note 7, at 209–10.  Note 
that this get law is phrased neutrally, and as such, can be utilized both with reference to Islamic and 
Jewish divorce.  See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 75.  But see, e.g., Gindi v. Gindi, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2001, at 31.  In one case, where there was 
both emotional abuse and financial manipulation on the part of the husband, as well as some 
indications that the husband was hiding assets, the wife was granted a larger amount of maintenance 
than would normally have been expected, given the short duration of the marriage, because the 
husband seemed unwilling to give her a get.  Id.  
 76.  See Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 374−75 (discussing alternative strategies 
used to circumvent legislation).  
 77.  See Jill Wexler, Gotta Get a Get: Maryland and Florida Should Adopt Get Statutes, 17 J.L. 
& POL’Y, 735, 750.  
 78.   See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 374.  Agudat Israel, who sponsored the first get law 
had “argued that financial penalties for non-participation in the get process pressures the husband to 
such an extent” that any subsequent get is given under the specter of duress.  Id.; see also Brief for 
Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 3, Becher v. 
Becher, 667 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1997) (No. 97−03205), appeal dismissed, 694 N.E.2d 885 
(N.Y. 1998) (attacking the constitutionality of the law).  The law received support from a good 
number of organizations.  See BREITOWITZ, supra note 7, at 209 n.611. 
 79.  See Choshen Mishpat 26:2, and Broyde, supra note 67 (noting that “the practice of resolving 
these disptues in secular court remain a clear violation of halachah, which requires that these types 
of disputes be resolved in Beit Din.” I”).  
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H.  The Prenuptial Contract as a Solution 
There have been growing attempts to utilize contracts to circumvent and 
prevent end-of-marriage issues.  An examination of the successes and 
challenges of religious prenuptial agreements will allow us to focus on the 
ways in which contract might be useful in allowing parties to govern their 
own affairs in accordance with a belief system, while still allowing those 
parties access to the secular courts’ powers of enforcement and assuring 
compliance.80 
The various attempts to utilize prenuptial contracts often have different 
goals.  Some, like the ketubah (and the mahr, for Muslims), are part and 
parcel of the religious marriage themselves, and thus aim to meet a religious 
obligation in the formation of marriage.81  Others serve as binding arbitration 
agreements, which attempt to fix, ahead of marriage, a religious tribunal as 
the chosen forum for dispute resolution.82  The most simple merely indicate 
(whether in the ketubah or in a standalone document) the forum in which 
end-of-marriage issues will be discussed, and thus function as arbitration 
agreements that name the religious tribunal as the arbitrator.83  More detailed 
contracts further specify what issues the religious tribunal is authorized to 
address.  At a minimum, these include the actual dissolution of the religious 
marriage, but the couple may also choose to have the religious tribunal act as 
an arbitration panel, adjudicate financial matters, and rule on issues related 
to child custody and visitation.84  Some contracts may allow the couple to 
indicate further a choice of law provision by not leaving the religious 
tribunal to apply their own presumptions and religious law, but asking, for 
example, that the tribunal take into account the law of a particular state 
 
 80.  See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 374−78.  
 81.  See id. at 376.  
 82.  Id. at 376−77.  The simplest of these is the so-called “Lieberman clause,” which was 
implemented by the Conservative movement.  Id.; see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 
1983).  This clause was rejected by the Orthodox movement.  See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, 
at 375 n.99.  
 83.  See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 375 (describing a prenuptial agreement requiring 
appearance before the beit din).  
 84.  See Binding Arbitration Agreement, BETH DIN OF AMERICA,  
http://www.theprenup.org/pdf/Prenup_Standard.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).  The initial version 
of this document was drafted by Rabbi Mordechai Willig at the behest of the Orthodox Caucus.  
Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 377 n.108.  It has since gone through several revisions.  The 
most recent version is available on the website.  See Binding Arbitration Agreement, supra note 84, 
at 4. 
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regarding division of property.85  Religious tribunals tend to look at the 
observance levels of the spouses in thinking about fault and often struggle to 
apply law with which they are less familiar.  The contracts often contain a 
financial penalty for the recalcitrant spouse; in practice, this amount is often 
forgiven in exchange for the get, much as in kuhl, where the mahr amount is 
forgiven in exchange for the divorce. 
Arbitration agreements such as these have been upheld by various state 
courts as enforceable.86  However, an anecdotal review of many such 
prenuptial agreements indicates that, as with many form agreements, a good 
number of them have been improperly filled out or are incomplete, dated 
wrong, or otherwise lack the marks of thoughtful contract formation.87 
Further, to the extent that the court views these documents through the lens 
of prenuptial agreements rather than simple contract law, the often higher 
standard of informed prior consent for contract formation for prenuptial 
agreements, the waiting periods, and issues of signatories and witnesses may 
raise difficulties.88  In addition, where the forms are incomplete—for 
example, where the specific name of a beit din is omitted—the court may 
find itself unwilling to read into the contract a specific religious tribunal out 
of fear of constitutional concerns.89  
Other religious prenuptial agreements include a simple document that 
uses the civil divorce as a trigger for the requirement of the husband to give 
the wife a get.90  Such an agreement, as noted above, raises questions of 
 
 85.  See Binding Arbitration Agreement, supra note 84, at 4.  The couple may also choose to 
allow the religious tribunal to take fault for the end of marriage into account.  Id. at 4.  
 86.  See, e.g., Light v. Light, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 145 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012); Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 
at 138−39.  
 87.  Not uncommon with form contracts, couples can leave provisions blank or can fail to get the 
document properly notarized.  See Guide to Signing the Prenup, ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
RESOLUTION OF AGUNOT, http://www.getora.org/#!guide-to-signing/c561 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014).  Couples often receive instructions from the officiating rabbi in a meeting prior to the 
wedding, or read (or fail to read) instructions included with the form.  See id.  Rarely do they seek 
legal advice.  See id.  The Organization for the Resolution of Agunot offers couples detailed in-
person instructions, as well as notary and counseling services as a way to ensure that such forms are 
filled out correctly.  See What We Do, ORGANIZATION FOR THE RESOLUTION OF AGUNOT, 
http://www.getora.org/#!what-we-do/c1476 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 88.  See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 74, at 378 n.117. 
 89.  See id. at 382  (“When a Beit Din is not specified, the prenuptial can potentially enmesh the 
secular court in the selection of a particular religious tribunal,” which may constitute excessive 
entanglement with religion.). 
 90.  See, for example, the prenuptial agreement utilized by Rabbi Haskel Lookstein of 
Congregation Kehillat Jeshurun (on file with author). 
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enforcement of specific performance by the court of an obligation that many 
would consider religious.91  A version of a prenuptial agreement, which 
consists of a promissory note by the husband for a very large sum of money 
along with a concomitant release note triggered by participation in the get 
process,92 is a self-actualizing simple solution that seems to have gained little 
traction.  This may be, in part, because of the need to execute multiple 
documents, the difficulty of predicting at the beginning of marriage what 
amount of money will be compelling at its end, and the challenges in 
collecting large amounts of money from a person who may not have access 
to such resources.93 
Yet another version of a prenuptial agreement is one in which the parties 
contract into particular forms of religious assumptions about marriage.94  
Evoking the introduction of the Jewish community as a third-party partner in 
the formation of marriage, as well as the notion of conditional marriage, 
these agreements attempt to change the halakhic structure of marriage by 
attesting the parties’ understanding of such at the entrance to marriage.95  
These types of agreements have not yet been tested by rabbinical or secular 
courts, but offer an interesting way to think about the interaction between 
developing internal religious legal norms and external authorities.  Some 
could view this as a parallel to the notion of covenantal marriage,96 which 
allows the couple to redefine their own understanding of the concept of 
marriage into which they wish to enter.97 
I.  Challenges for the Contractual Solutions 
These contractual solutions are limited by the necessary requirement 
that they are prospective, and thus do not help those without the foresight to 
sign them.  However, they do hold the promise of greatly reducing the 
 
 91.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 92.  BREITOWITZ, supra note 7, at 119.  The promissory note is triggered when the husband 
refuses to grant the wife a get.  Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious 
Prenuptial Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 377 (1999).  
 93.  See id.  
 94.  Michael J. Broyde, A Proposed Tripartite Agreement to Solve Some of the Agunah 
Problems: A Solution Without Any Innovation, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XX: THE 
MANCHESTER 2008 CONFERENCE VOLUME 1, 1 (Leib Moscovitz ed., 2010).  
 95.  See id. at 5−6.  
 96.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2013) (state covenantal marriage 
statutes). 
 97.  See, e.g., id. § 25-901.  
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number of victims of get refusal—and still there is reluctance in many parts 
of the community to enter into such agreements.98  In part, the backlash 
against broad-based acceptance of religious prenuptial agreements in the 
Jewish community stems from articulated public policy concerns regarding 
the effects on commitment to marriage that arise from discussing and 
planning for dissolution of marriage at its onset.99  Perhaps more 
surprisingly, there has been a backlash among younger women who wish to 
indicate allegiance to an ideal of life-long, trouble-free marriage and against 
what they see as a feminist encroachment into the area of extreme fidelity to 
a traditional lifestyle.100  This grappling of opposing, deeply held beliefs and 
value systems is at the heart of a struggle at both the communal and 
individual levels: how does one live as a religious person with a fidelity to 
religious law and ways of being while also being influenced and often 
engaged by ideas of gender equality, justice, and fairness with conflicting 
incentives, whether financial or custodial? 
It is not only the parties themselves that are affected by these issues.  As 
noted above, the judges who adjudicate cases where such issues arise often 
struggle with the idea that their courtrooms are being used to perpetuate an 
injustice, while they simultaneously remain concerned about addressing 
questions that they feel constitutionally constrained from hearing.  Members 
of the matrimonial bar are also navigating these issues, as they attempt to 
gain full advantage for their clients but know the effects of withholding a get 
are serious and often tragic.  Finally, religious judges, scholars, and leaders 
are often conflicted about resolving issues that arise within the Jewish legal 
context by utilizing the secular courts, as well as balancing conflicting 
values of a belief in the need for strong first marriages with protecting those 
who get trapped in the difficulties of an agunah situation. 
 
 98.  See Frequently Asked Questions About the Prenup, ORG. FOR RESOL. AGUNOT, 
http://www.getora.org/#!faq-prenup/ct8s (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
 99.  See Paul Berger, In Victory for ‘Chained’ Wives, Court Upholds Orthodox Prenuptial 
Agreement, FORWARD (Feb. 8, 2013), http://forward.com/articles/170721/in-victory-for-chained-
wives-court-upholds-o/ (noting that prenuptial agreements are “gaining acceptance despite distaste 
and superstition among some couples who do not relish insuring against their divorce days before 
their wedding”). 
 100.  See 7 AM. JEWISH COMM., AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK 196 (1997) (discussing the 
backlash towards the feminist movement’s interest in traditional Jewish marriage).  
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J.  From Powerless to Empowered and Back 
A review of the various attempts to utilize both religious and secular 
courts to resolve the agunah issue offers a window into how religious actors 
and religious tribunals attempt to utilize secular law to empower religion, 
while at the same time remaining conflicted about the nature of their own 
power.  Religious communities have shied away from deep involvement in 
the secular legal system, but as religious tribunals attempt to empower 
themselves, they find that they must engage, however unwillingly and 
unpredictably, with the secular legal system.  The use of contract is an 
increasingly common way of attempting to navigate the secular legal system 
and empowering religious communities to achieve results in line with 
secular norms of gender equality.  While private contract at the time of 
marriage formation has the potential to address some of these issues, a great 
deal of thought, reflection, and education is still necessary to fully allow the 
empowerment of the individual. 
 
